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I. INTRODUCTION
As an American who has lived in Europe several times, in my early
career as a scholar I assumed that a general consensus existed in other
nations that the United States torts system is one of the problems with the
* John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I would like to
thank Kendra Lounsberry and Jennifer Vagle for their outstanding research assistance, and to thank
Pepperdine University School of Law for supporting my work on this article with a research grant. I
would also like to thank the Honorable Allen Linden for his helpful comments on this topic, for his
inspirational example as a scholar and a teacher, and for the years of encouragement and friendship
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United States.' However, in 2000 I spoke at an international conference on
safety and injury prevention in India, and the experience broadened my
perspective. 2  Most of the speakers at the conference were not torts law
scholars. The speakers included many engineers, product and transportation
safety specialists, and government officials responsible for safety issues in
their nations. A large percentage of these safety experts were citizens of
developing nations.
Prior to attending this conference I had often heard about, and had
experienced personally, negative impressions of United States tort law in
Western Europe and elsewhere. For example, the McDonald's hot coffee
case seems to have developed iconic status internationally as a symbol of
why United States tort law is something to be feared or at least avoided.3
Thus, I was surprised to discover that the reaction to United States tort
law from the individuals who spoke with me at this conference seemed
mostly positive rather than mostly negative. A common theme to the
comments I heard was that if they could have more tort litigation like the
United States in their nations, they might have far fewer tragic accidents and
injuries. Safety experts from developing nations were particularly likely to
complain that their nations' regulatory systems were inadequate to optimally
deter accidents and that a more robust tort system would benefit injury
deterrence.
Perhaps this surprisingly optimistic perspective on United States torts
law was also being reflected when, in 2005, over 150 nations finalized the
World Health Organization ("WHO") Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, which encourages use of U.S.-style torts litigation against sellers as
a way to limit tobacco usage.4 Framework conventions are technically
1. The assertion of a British commentator in 1997 that "[iit is a paradox that the Land of the
Free is actually a land chained by excessive legislation, litigation, and pettyfogging nannydom" is
representative of the kinds of complaints I have often heard from Europeans regarding the United
States torts system. Kristen Gartman Rogers, "Mad Plaintiff Disease?" Tobacco Litigation and the
British Debate over Adoption of US.-Style Tort Litigation Methods, 27 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 199,
200 n.9 (1998) (quoting Yes, Smoking Kills, But Litigation Is Ruinous, INDEPENDENT (London), June
23, 1997, at 14).
2. Fifth World Conference on Injury Prevention and Control, New Delhi, India, Mar. 2000.
3. See Eric A. Feldman, Law Across Borders: What Can the United States Learn from Japan?,
32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 795, 801 (2009) (presenting the McDonald's hot coffee case as
one of the celebrated cases that causes the American legal system to be regularly vilified by the
media within and outside of the U.S.); Allen M. Linden, Viva Torts!, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 139, 151-
52 (2005) (stating that most people have heard about the McDonald's case and noting that it has
caused tort law to be ridiculed and "condemned ... as 'out of control"'); see also Anthony Ramirez,
Wordfor WordlHot Water; For McDonald's, British Justice is a Diferent Cup of Tea, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/07/weekinreview/word-for-word-hot-water-for-
mcdonald-s-british-justice-is-a-different-cup-of-tea.html ("By now, the case of the $3 million cup of
coffee is securely lodged as Exhibit A in the minds of those who believe the American legal system
has run amok.").
4. The World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control was adopted in
2003 and came into force on February 27, 2005. To date, 171 countries have signed the Treaty.
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binding, but they "actually fall somewhere between nonbinding resolutions
and treaty law since they contain no explicit obligations."' The framework
convention approach has been described as particularly helpful in efforts to
control tobacco usage internationally because "it is a continuous and
dynamic process of lawmaking that can gradually and incrementally build
support to reduce tobacco use."6 Efforts to reduce tobacco use are hardly
novel. In 1604, King James described smoking as a "filthie no[v]eltie" that
was, among other things, "dangerous to the Lungs," and he declared that
using it was "sinning against God."' In the United States, the Surgeon
General's pronouncement that cigarette smoking is hazardous to health was
made in 1964, and since then both the federal government and states have
made enormous and widely publicized efforts to discourage smoking.
The Tobacco Control Framework is novel in part because of its
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/ftc/en
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
5. Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE
J. INT'L L. 257, 294 (1996).
6. Id.
7. King James made it clear that he was a staunch critic of tobacco use:
Haue you not reason then to bee ashamed, and to forbeare this filthie noueltie, so basely
grounded, so foolishly receiued and so grossely mistaken in the right vse thereof? In
your abuse thereof sinning against God, harming yourselues both in persons and goods,
and taking also thereby the markes and notes of vanitie vpon you: by the custome thereof
making your selues to be wondered at by all forraine ciuil Nations, and by all strangers
that come among you, to be scorned and contemned. [Smoking is] [a] custome lothsome
to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, dangerous to the Lungs, and in
the blacke stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit
that is bottomelesse.
KING JAMES I, A COVNTER-BLASTE TO TOBACCO (Edmund Goldsmid ed., 1884) (1604), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/l 7008/17008-h/I 7008-h.htm.
8. Most recently, on April 1, 2009, the largest federal tobacco tax increase in history took
effect, raising federal excise taxes on cigarettes from 39 cents per pack to $1.01 per pack. Wendy
Koch, Biggest U.S. Tax Hike on Tobacco Takes Effect, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.
usatoday.com/money/perfiltaxes/2009-03-3 I -cigarettetaxN.htm.
Of course, in a state like California that has been successful in reducing smoking rates,
tobacco control policy is by no means restricted to tobacco tax increases. The other most
effective policies seem to be very tough controls on indoor smoking at both work and
leisure venues and a very aggressive antismoking advertising program.
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Balanced Tobacco Control Policy, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 416, 418 (2003)
(emphasis added). Since California started running its anti-smoking ads in the late 1980s, the
percentage of its residents that smoke has dropped from 22% to 16%. Gregg Jones, Tobacco Firms
Sue State over Ads, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/apr/03/local/me-
mean3. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act has also recently been amended by the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, and it now requires, among other
things, that cigarette packaging be labeled with one of several listed warnings which should
comprise 50% of the front and back of the pack. See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 Stat. 1776
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000)).
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commitment to international coordination on efforts to limit cigarette
smoking. King James was presumably writing primarily for a British
audience, and most subsequent undertakings to discourage smoking have
also focused on citizens of individual nations. Probably the most
controversial governmental anti-smoking efforts have been lawsuits to
recover medical costs spent by governmental entities to pay for medical care
for citizens suffering illnesses caused by smoking. Best known is the
litigation initiated by most of the states in the United States, which resulted
in enormous settlements totaling $246 billion in 1998.9 Critics of the
government healthcare reimbursement lawsuits have often argued that the
tort claims were not a good fit for governments seeking to further broaden
policy goals.'o
The Tobacco Control Framework is remarkable not only because of its
unprecedented internationalization of antismoking efforts, but also in its
focus on using tort law as a form of tobacco control. Among other things,
the signing nations agreed to consider expanding tort lawsuits against
tobacco sellers. Article 19 of the Framework states that "[fior the purpose of
tobacco control, the Parties shall consider taking legislative action or
promoting their existing laws, where necessary, to deal with criminal and
civil liability, including compensation where appropriate."" The
convention also encouraged governments to share information with each
other to facilitate such lawsuits. Article 19 provides that "[plarties shall
cooperate with each other in exchanging information ... including ...
information on legislation and regulations in force as well as pertinent
9. See Lester Brickman, Want to Be a Billionaire? Sue a Tobacco Company, WALL ST. J., Dec.
30, 1998, at Al0; Sylvia Nasar, The World: Smokescreen; The Ifs and Buts of the Tobacco
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/29/weekinreview/the-
world-smokescreen-the-ifs-and-buts-of-the-tobacco-settlement.html (discussing how the multi-
billion dollar award is more similar to taxes than damages); Settlement Spurs Record Cigarette Price
Hike, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, http://articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/24/business/fi-47160
(discussing the consequences of the settlement on tobacco prices); Editorial, Spending the Tobacco
Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/01/opinion/spending-the-
tobacco-billions.html (discussing where states will allocate the money they receive from the
settlement).
10. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and
Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 465 (1998)
("analyz[ing] how changing social perceptions about the tobacco industry, erosion of the assumption
of risk doctrine, and new evidence regarding addiction and ... fraud will [a]ffect third wave cases");
Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897 (1998) (analyzing the role of litigation in shaping policy and considering
how tobacco litigation has contributed to defining the tobacco problem and available policy
alternatives); Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1721 (2008) [hereinafter Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies] (discussing the main
factors contributing to the success in reducing tobacco use and the strategies that have been less
effective than those factors).
I1. World Health Organization (WHO): Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 42 I.L.M.
518, 530 (2003).
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jurisprudence."l 2
In early 2010, Haik Nikogosian, the Convention Secretariat of the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, declared that the Convention
"has become one of the most widely and rapidly ratified treaties in the
history of the United Nations." 3  Reportedly, third-world nations were
especially enthusiastic about the treaty and expressed great interest in the
United States' healthcare reimbursement lawsuits.
This particular interest by third world nations is in some respects not
surprising. According to the World Health Organization, tobacco companies
are increasingly focusing on expanding markets in third world nations. 14
Groups with lower socioeconomic status have higher smoking rates than
higher income groups,'5 and, at least with regard to males, many poorer
nations have higher smoking rates than wealthier nations.16  Further,
effective direct governmental regulation of tobacco is probably more
difficult in third world nations than in industrial nations with more thorough
regulatory frameworks.' 7 Finally, the huge amount of money paid by
12. Id. at 531.
13. Haik Nikogosian, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: A Key Milestone, 88
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 83, 83 (2010), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/
2/10-075895.pdf.
14. See Allyn L. Taylor & Douglas W. Bettcher, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: A Global "Good" for Public Health, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 920, 924 (2000),
available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78(7)920.pdf.
15. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1723.
16. According to the Center for Disease Control, an estimated 20.6% of Americans still smoke.
Cigarette Smoking Among Adults and Trends in Smoking Cessation-United States, 2008, 58
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. 1227 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/
wk/mm5844.pdf. Compare this to poorer nations like Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and Nepal
where over 40% of males use tobacco. Judith Mackay & Michael Eriksen, The Tobacco Atlas,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 24-25 (2002), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/
2002/9241562099.pdf. Rates are even higher in Malaysia where about 50% of men smoke, and
Cambodia, where 67% of urban men smoke and 86% of men from rural areas smoke. Smoking
Statistics, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.wpro.who.int/mediacentre/fact_
sheets/fs_20020528.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
17. According In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration has certain authority over
the regulation of tobacco products. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). The United Kingdom has passed the Tobacco Advertising and
Promotion Act 2002 banning the advertising of tobacco products. Tobacco Advertising and
Promotion Act 2002, c. 36 (U.K.). Canada has one of the most comprehensive tobacco regulation
programs with solutions such as the National Strategy on Tobacco Control and the Tobacco Act of
1997 which regulates both product information and tobacco reporting. See Best Practices in
Tobacco Control: Regulation of Tobacco Products: Canada Report, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION 1-2 (2005),http://www.who.int/tobacco/globalinteraction/tobreg/Canada%2OBest
%20Practice%2OFinalFor/o20Printing.pdf. Compare these regulatory schemes in wealthier nations
to countries like Uzbekistan, Croatia, Czech Republic and other third world nations that do not even
have a national tobacco action plan. See Regional Office for Europe, Cross Country Profile
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tobacco companies to the states to settle reimbursement lawsuits would be
especially appealing to poor nations.
Even before the Tobacco Control Framework was created, many lawsuits
outside of the United States were initiated in the wake of the huge success of the
states' healthcare reimbursement lawsuits in the United States. By early 2010,
lawsuits had been filed in at least thirty-five nations outside of the United
States.18 The lawsuits in other nations have included individual lawsuits, class
actions, and health care reimbursement lawsuits by governments.' 9
Most of these lawsuits have not succeeded thus far, and some have failed
spectacularly. One colorful example is Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris
Companies, a 1999 case in which the nation of Bolivia sought to sue Philip
Morris for health care reimbursement in state court in Brazoria County, Texas.20
The case was then removed to federal court in Texas. 2'
Database, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2002), http://data.euro.who.int/tobacco/Default.
aspx?TablD=2444 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). Other third world countries such as Haiti, Ethiopia,
Bhutan and the Marshall Islands still do not even require health warnings on cigarette packaging.
Mackay & Eriksen, supra note 16, at 78-79; see also Dolwick Tobacco Control Country Profiles
2003, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY (2003), http://www.who.int/tobacco/globaldata/country
profiles/Appendix B.pdf (for a detailed list of tobacco control legislation by country).
18. These nations include Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Finland, France, French Guiana, Germany, Greenland, India, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mali, Marshall Islands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines,
Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The "Tobacco Wars "-Global Litigation Strategies, 298 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 2537, 2537-38 (2007); Richard A. Daynard, Clive Bates & Neil Francey, Tobacco Litigation
Worldwide, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 11l, 112 (2000); D. Douglas Blanke, Towards Health with Justice:
Litigation and Public Inquiries as Tools for Tobacco Control, WHO TOBACCO FREE INITIATIVE,
http://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/final jordan-report.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2010); M.L.
Flores et al., Litigation in Argentina: Challenging the Tobacco Industry, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 90,
90-92 (2006), http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd42/90.pdf; Andrew Walker, Nigeria Takes on
Tobacco Giants, B.B.C. NEWS (Jan. 14, 2008, 0:23 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7183018
.stm; Mackay & Erikson, supra note 16, at 86-87.
19. Individual lawsuits against tobacco companies have been brought in numerous countries,
some of which include Argentina, Ireland, Israel, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and Turkey. Daynard, Bates & Francey, supra note 18, at 111. One famous individual
case was filed in Norway by Robert Lund who developed lung cancer from working in a smoky bar
for fifteen years. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 40. Two other illustrations of these types of cases
are Spasic v. Imperial Tobacco and Spasic Estate v. B.A.T. Industries p.l.c., filed in Canada,
demanding millions in damages. See Tobacco-Related Litigation in Canada, NON-SMOKERS'
RIGHTS ASSOCIATION 22 (2009), http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdflTobaccoRelated
Litigation_in Canada_2009.pdf. As of 2002, there were four private class actions pending in the
Canadian Provinces of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia. See Blanke, supra note 18, at 40.
Class actions have also been filed in Australia against the major Australian tobacco companies.
Daynard, Bates & Francey, supra note 18, at 112. Health care reimbursement lawsuits have been
filed in the Canadian Province of British Columbia, as well as by the governmental health insurance
body in France. Id. at 111. The government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands has brought a
health care reimbursement case against international tobacco companies that supply the local market.
Id. Other countries, including Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, also have
reimbursement suits pending in federal court in the United States. Id.
20. 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
21. Id. at 1008.
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The court noted that this was "one of at least six similar actions brought by
foreign governments in various courts throughout the United States." 22 In
addition to Bolivia, the court cited similar lawsuits in the United States filed by
Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Thailand, and Venezuela. 23 Not surprisingly,
these are all relatively poor nations, and they may not have civil tort systems that
are as sophisticated or as generous as those found in the United States.
The court exercised its authority and discretion to transfer the case sua
sponte to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as "a
much more logical venue for the parties and witnesses in this action," noting that
Bolivia had an embassy and governmental representatives there.24 However,
the court in Brazoria County, Texas, chose not to send Bolivia away quietly.
Rather, it opted to unleash a few broadsides to accompany the plaintiff out of its
jurisdiction. First, the court declared that "[w]hy none of these countries seems
to have a court system their own governments have confidence in is a mystery to
this [c]ourt."25 Turning to humor, or perhaps mockery, the court went on to
state that it "seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen a live
Bolivian ... even on the Discovery Channel."2 6 By the time the court noted that
"there isn't even a Bolivian restaurant anywhere near here," it was clear that the
case was not deemed worthy of serious analysis.2 7 As a coup de grace, the court
mentioned that it has a somewhat dated globe on its premises, and that
[w]hile the [c]ourt does not therefrom profess to understand all of the
political subtleties of the geographical transmogrifications ongoing in
Eastern Europe, the [c]ourt is virtually certain that Bolivia is not within
the four counties over which this [c]ourt presides, even though the
words Bolivia and Brazoria are a lot alike and caused some real, initial
confusion until the [c]ourt conferred with its law clerks. Thus, it is
readily apparent, even from an outdated globe such as that possessed by
this [c]ourt, that Bolivia, a hemisphere away, ain't in south-central
Texas, and that, at the very least, the District of Columbia is a more
appropriate venue (though Bolivia isn't located there either).28
22. Id. at 1009.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1009-10.
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Following this send-off, the case apparently died on the vine in the
District of Columbia.29
II. CANADA AS A POTENTIAL COUNTER-ILLUSTRATION
Although it is too early to predict with any certainty, significant
litigation in progress in Canada may ultimately provide a counter-illustration
to the trend of tobacco litigation outside of the United States failing to gain
traction. Canada has been described as playing a "lead role" in creation and
enactment of the WHO Tobacco Control Framework.30  This Canadian
enthusiasm for the Framework is interesting given Canada's historical track
record in tobacco litigation. In 2004 a Canadian scholar noted that, in
contrast to tobacco litigation in the United States, Canadian tobacco lawsuits
"cannot be described in terms of successive 'waves,' or even 'ripples.' The
simple fact is that there has never been successful tobacco-related litigation
in Canada.",3  Although by 2010 this record of no successful tobacco-related
29. After the case was transferred, it was consolidated with similar cases filed by Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Venezuela and Thailand. In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., No.
1279, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8803 (J.P.M.L. June 10, 1999). Plaintiff Guatemala's claim was
thereafter dismissed with prejudice because the injury claimed was too remote to be proximately
caused by the defendants' misconduct. Republic of Guatemala v. Tobacco Institute (In re
Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig.), 83 F. Supp. 2d 125, 135 (D.D.C. 1999). Plaintiff
Venezuela's claim was then remanded to state court where it was originally filed due to lack of
federal jurisdiction. In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 F. Supp. 2d 31
(D.D.C. 2000). Defendant British American Tobacco's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction was granted because Plaintiff failed to show required minimum contacts or conspiracy
between defendant holding company and defendant subsidiaries and non-affiliated co-defendants.
United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 (D.D.C. 2000). Defendants' motions
to dismiss MCRA and MSP claims were granted, but the motion to dismiss RICO claims was
denied. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d. 131, 155 (D.D.C. 2000). After
numerous other objections, motions, and decisions, including some that involved sanctions for
misconduct by the tobacco interests during proceedings, the D.C. District Court ruled in favor of the
government on the RICO claims, and found that there had been a fifty-year conspiracy to deceive the
American public about the health effects and addictiveness of cigarettes. See United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 937-45 (D.D.C. 2006). The court awarded remedies that
included permanent enjoinment of certain activities and promotions in connection with cigarette
sales in the United States, publication and dissemination of corrective statements, and restriction of
the sale of tobacco businesses without court involvement. Id. The District Court's decision was
partially overturned on appeal, but the RICO violations as to the manufacturers were upheld. United
States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A petition for certiorari
was filed in this case on February 19, 2010, but was denied on June 28, 2010. Philip Morris USA
Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3501 (2010).
30. See Jeff Berryman, Canadian Reflections on the Tobacco Wars: Some Unintended
Consequences ofMass Tort Litigation, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 579, 594 (2004).
31. Idat581.
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litigation in Canada is no longer perfect, successes have thus far remained
rare. 32
In 1998, the Canadian Province of British Columbia began protracted
litigation that may have the effect of changing Canada's tobacco litigation
landscape. In that year, British Columbia filed a healthcare reimbursement
lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers seeking billions of dollars.33 As with
many other international lawsuits, this action was filed in the wake of the
huge settlement with the states in the United States, and it bears striking
resemblances to the states' claims in many respects. The Canadians even
hired some United States lawyers with experience in the United States
litigation.34
Although British Columbia's lawsuit was inspired by the healthcare
reimbursement lawsuits in the United States, British Columbia's lawsuit has
many advantages over the successful United States lawsuits. These
advantages primarily stem from a statute enacted in British Columbia
authorizing the lawsuit and considerably easing British Columbia's task in
establishing liability. The original British Columbia statute empowering
the lawsuit was enacted in 1997.36 However, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia struck down the original statute in 2000 as ultra vires.n The
British Columbia legislature then enacted the statute currently in force in
2001 .38 The current statute, titled the Tobacco Damages and Health Care
Costs Recovery Act, provides that "[t]he government has a direct and
distinct action against a manufacturer to recover the cost of health care
benefits caused or contributed to by a tobacco related wrong." 9
Under the statute, the government must prove that tobacco
32. The most prominent example of successful tobacco-related litigation in Canada to date is the
government's lawsuit against tobacco sellers based on smuggling cigarettes into Canada from the
United States. The Government of Canada filed the lawsuit against several major tobacco
companies on December 21, 1999, seeking to recover one billion dollars in lost tax revenue.
Government of Canada Launches Legal Action in Major Tobacco Smuggling Operation, DEP'T OF
JUSTICE CAN., (Dec. 21, 1999), http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071206004212/
http://canada.justice.gc.calen/news/nr/1999/doc 24494.html. After over ten years of litigation, the
case finally settled on April 13, 2010 for $550 million dollars. Tobacco Firms to Pay $550 Million
Over Smuggling, CANADIAN BROAD. CORP., http://www.cbc.calcanadalstory/2010/04/13/tobacco-
smuggling-lawsuit-settled.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2010).
33. il-Macdonald Corp. v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.), 2000 BCSC 312 (Can. B.C.).
34. See Rob Linke, U.S. Lawyer Says N.B. Has Leg Up in Tobacco Lawsuit, THE DAILY
GLEANER (FREDERICTION), Mar. 24, 2008, at A4.
35. Tobacco Damages Recovery Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 41 (Can.), repealed by Tobacco Damages
and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 (Can.).
36. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2005) 2 S.C.R. 473 (Can.).
37. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2000 BCSC 312.
38. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 17.
39. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act § 2(1).
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manufacturers breached a duty owed to persons in British Columbia under
common law, statute, or equity, and that exposure can cause or contribute to
disease. 4 0 This part of the statute does not seem controversial; it sets forth
that the standard of liability is negligence (the notion of strict products
liability, allowed in most United States jurisdictions, is not permitted), and
that causation is necessary. However, the statute also contains more
interesting and provocative provisions.
For example, the statute provides that for healthcare recovery claims,
the government does not need to identify particular individual insured
persons or prove individual causation. 41 Further, if breach of duty is proven,
under the statute, the court is to shift the burden of proof to manufacturers
regarding persons would have been exposed to tobacco but for the breach,
and regarding causation of disease in a portion of the population due to
exposure to tobacco. 42 The statute also allows population-based statistical,
sociological, or epidemiological studies to prove and quantify damages.43
Under the statute, manufacturers found liable are responsible for healthcare
expenditures in proportion to their market share for cigarettes in British
Columbia, calculated between the time of their first breach and trial." All
provisions of the statute apply retroactively.45
These provisions substantially ease the government's case against
tobacco manufacturers, effectively removing some of the most difficult
causation and proof stumbling blocks to finding healthcare reimbursement
liability for a governmental plaintiff. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada
described the statute's provision allowing for liability on an aggregate basis
for a population of persons for whom the government has made or can
reasonably be expected to make expenditures as "crucial."4 6
Finally, the statue disallows statute of limitations defenses for any action
brought within two years of the statute's enactment.47  Reflecting an
admirable devotion to punctuality, British Columbia's government filed suit
the day the statute came into force rather than waiting two years.48
40. Id § 7(2). Significantly, the statute utilizes negligence language rather than strict liability.
"Despite calls from leading academics to adopt the US approach, Canada has resolutely opted to stay
with an essentially negligence driven model requiring proof of a failure to exercise reasonable care."
Berryman, supra note 30, at 582 (citing ALLEN LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 599 (Butterworths,
7th ed. 2001); S. M. WADDAMS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 231 (Thomson Carlson, 4th ed. 2002); and W.
Linden, The Potential for a Tort Action Against Tobacco Manufacturers in Canada, 6 ADVOC. Soc.
J. 25 (1987)).
41. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act § 2(5).
42. See id. § 3.
43. Id. § 5.
44. Id. §§ 3(3)(b), 1(6).
45. Id. § 10.
46. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 8 (Can.).
47. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act § 6(1).
48. See Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 17.
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After passage of the current statute, its constitutionality was fiercely
debated. 4 9 The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately upheld the statute's
constitutionality in 2005 in Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. v. British
Columbia.50 In upholding the statute, the court first addressed a challenge
that it violates territorial limitations on provincial legislative competence."
In analyzing this issue the court determined that the statute's essential
character-its "pith and substance"-was the creation of a civil cause of
action,52 and that there were "strong relationships among [British
Columbia], the subject matter of the law ... [,] and the persons made subject
to it" with due respect for the sovereignty of other jurisdictions.5 ' The court
rejected "undue" emphasis on whether acts creating liability under the cause
of action must occur within British Columbia for two reasons. 54
First, the court described compensation for health care costs, rather than
remediation of breaches of duty, as the "driving force" behind the cause of
action." Thus, questions regarding whether the breaches of duty might have
taken place outside of British Columbia "have little or no bearing on the
strength of the relationship between the cause of action and the enacting
jurisdiction."56 Second, the court emphasized that any breaches of duty that
took place were owed to persons in British Columbia, were related to
tobacco, and were matters that created health care expenditures by British
Columbia's government-thus, any breaches of duty owed under the cause
of action were "strongly related to British Columbia."57
The court next analyzed whether the statute unduly interfered with
judicial independence, which is a "foundational principle" of Canada's
constitution.58 The manufacturers argued that the statute forced courts to
make "irrational presumptions" (i.e., the presumptions that persons in British
Columbia exposed to tobacco products would not have been exposed but for
the manufacturers' breaches of duty, and that the exposure caused or
contributed to disease or risk of disease in a portion of the population). 9
The manufacturers also argued that portions of the statute "impinge on the
49. See id. at para. 2.
50. Id. at para. 3.
51. See id. at para. 25-43.
52. Id. at para. 32.
53. Id. at para. 37.
54. See id. at para. 39.
55. See id. at para. 40.
56. Id.
57. Id. at para. 41.
58. See id. at para. 25, 44-56.
59. Id. at para. 48, app. § 3(2).
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court's fact-finding function, and virtually guarantee the government's
success in an action brought pursuant to the [Tobacco Damages and Health
Care Costs Recovery] Act."60
In responding to these arguments the court may have tipped its hand
regarding the public policy merits of the statute and of British Columbia's
lawsuit. The court asserted that the statute's rules "are not as unfair or
illogical as the appellants submit." 6' Rather, "[t]hey appear to reflect
legitimate policy concerns of the British Columbia legislature regarding the
systematic advantages tobacco manufacturers enjoy when claims for
tobacco-related harm are litigated through individualistic common law tort
actions."62 The apparent perception by the Supreme Court of Canada that
the statute seems reasonably fair may be significant in future matters that
may come before that court related to British Columbia's lawsuit, statute, or
the lawsuits or statutes of several other Canadian provinces that are similar
to those of British Columbia. If the court believes that the statute's
exceptionally helpful pro-plaintiff rules are reasonably fair, this perspective
may color future issues that the court might face related to the statute or
similar statutes.
The court did not, however, base its judicial independence analysis on
whether the statute is fair or logical. Despite its language favorable to
British Columbia on those questions, the court concluded that they are in
any event "beside the point."" Rather, the court emphasized that the issue is
whether the statute's rules "interfere with the court's adjudicative role."6
The court found that the statute does not fundamentally interfere with or
alter "'the relationship between the courts and the other branches of
government."' 66  Under the statute, the courts are still permitted to
independently determine whether the statute is applicable to the
government's claim, assess the evidence, and determine whether the
evidence supports a finding of liability.67
The manufacturers also asserted that the statute violates the "rule of
law."68  The Court noted controversy between experts regarding when
violation of "rule of law" renders a statute unconstitutional, and quoted a
lower court judge's observation that "[a]dvocates tend to read into the
principle of the rule of law anything which supports their particular view of
60. Id. at para. 48.
61. Id. at para. 49.
62. Id
63. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
64. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 49.
65. Id
66. Id. at para. 54 (quoting Babcock v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. 57).
67. Id at para. 55.
68. Id. at para. 25.
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what the law should be." 69 For their part, the manufacturers argued that
concern for the rule of law "requires that legislation: (1) be prospective; (2)
be general in character; (3) not confer special privileges on the government,
except where necessary for effective governance; and (4) ensure a fair civil
trial."7 o The manufacturers also argued that the statute violated each of
these requirements.n
The Supreme Court of Canada gave little credence to the manufacturers'
interpretation of rule of law requirements, finding that it falls "at one
extreme of the spectrum of possible conceptions."72 First, the court held that
neither the provisions of the Canadian Constitution nor rule of law concerns
prohibit retroactive or ex post facto laws except in the area of criminal law.
This is so "despite the fact that retrospective and retroactive legislation can
overturn settled expectations and is sometimes perceived as unjust."74
Further, although in this case statutory provisions were at issue, "[i]t might
also be observed that developments in the common law have always had
retroactive and retrospective effect.",7
Regarding the manufacturers' arguments that legislation must be general
in character and must not generally confer special benefits to the
government, the court cited two earlier cases that had upheld legislation
despite its being aimed at a specific industry or group, and despite having
the purpose of benefitting the government.76 Finally, the court assured the
manufacturers that they would receive a fair trial "in the sense that the
concept is traditionally understood: they are entitled to a public hearing,
before an independent and impartial court, in which they may contest the
claims of the plaintiff and adduce evidence in their defence."n
In late 2009, over British Columbia's objections, the tobacco
manufacturers' situation was potentially improved to some extent when the
British Columbia Court of Appeal approved adding a seemingly unlikely
third party defendant to the lawsuit: the Canadian federal government. In
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., the British Columbia
69. Id. at para. 62.
70. Id at para. 63.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at para. 69.
74. Id. at para. 71.
75. Id. at para. 72.
76. Id at para. 74-75 (citing Air Can. v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161 (Can.) , and
Autherson v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40 (Can.)).
77. Id. at para. 76.
78. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., 2009 BCCA 540 (Can. B.C.). On the same
day, the court also decided Knight v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2009 BCCA 541 (Can. B.C.),
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Court of Appeal held that the tobacco manufacturers could add a third party
contribution and indemnity claim against Canada's federal government,
based in part on an argument that the federal government helped to develop
"light" strains of tobacco and light cigarettes, which may have given
consumers a false sense of safety.79 Regardless of whether this ruling is
upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada, it seems unlikely to
derail British Columbia's lawsuit. Rather than removing tobacco
manufacturers from liability, it only adds a potential additional party to share
in damages payments. Further, the tobacco manufacturers would have to
prove their argument that the federal government acted improperly and that
such improper conduct caused harm before deflecting any amount of
damages payments to the federal government.
Beyond its significance in permitting the British Columbia litigation to
move forward, British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. may
become exceptionally important both to other tobacco-related healthcare
reimbursement lawsuits in Canada, and to tobacco litigation in other nations,
for at least two reasons. First, the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs
Recovery Act's strong pro-government provisions may put manufacturers at
a significant disadvantage in the litigation compared with previous lawsuits,
including the healthcare reimbursement lawsuits in the United States that
ultimately proved to be spectacularly successful. The cigarette
manufacturers themselves have said as much.80 As noted above, one of the
manufacturers' arguments against the statute's constitutionality was that, if
upheld, the statute would "virtually guarantee the government's success in
an action brought pursuant to the [Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs
Recovery] Act." 8' Indeed, if the manufacturers' arguments before the court
were made in good faith, one must wonder about their apparent signals that
they will not settle. Even after the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the
manufacturers' challenge to the statute's constitutionality, a representative of
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. insisted regarding a related lawsuit by
Ontario that "[t]here's not going to be any settlement."82 If sincere, this is
quite a gritty strategy for a case in which manufacturers believe the
government's success is, by the manufacturers' own admission, "virtually
guarantee[d]."8  After the court's decision, Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.
in similar fashion.
79. See Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., 2009 BCCA 540, at para. 69-91. For further discussion of
Justice Tysoe's reasoning, see Knight, 2009 BCCA 541, at para. 37-60.
80. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
81. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 48.
82. Referencing the Ontario litigation modeled on the British Columbia litigation, Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd. director of external communications was quoted as saying: "There's not going
to be any settlement." Rob Ferguson, Big Tobacco Sued for $50 Billion, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 30,
2009, http://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/article/703031 [hereinafter Ferguson, Big Tobacco
Sued].
83. Imperial Tobacco Can. Ltd, 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 48.
296
[Vol. 38: 283, 2011] International Tobacco
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
vice-president Don McCarty was quoted as stating that "BC can expect long-
winded and bad-tempered litigation," and that "[i]t could be the biggest case
in the history of Canadian jurisprudence."8
In addition to placing British Columbia in a seemingly favorable
litigation position, the British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.
decision provides important precedent and intellectual ammunition for other
governmental entities, both in Canada and beyond, that have or may in the
future wish to adopt similar pro-government legislation to pursue cigarette
manufacturers for healthcare reimbursement costs. The Tobacco Damages
and Health Care Costs Recovery Act's provisions are fairly stunning in their
boldness, and yet Canada's highest court has thoughtfully articulated a
position that they are basically fair and permissible. The court's reasoning
in upholding the statute is certain to be referenced and relied upon in similar
lawsuits in the future.
Second, British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. will not
only strengthen future tobacco reimbursement lawsuits, it will also inspire
them. This snowball effect is already well under way within Canada.
Several other Canadian provinces have now joined British Columbia in
suing tobacco manufacturers in healthcare reimbursement lawsuits. In
November 2005, less than two months after the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld British Columbia's healthcare recovery statute, the Canadian
Medical Association Journal reported that all of Canada's provinces were
likely to "jump on the litigation bandwagon" in light of the court's
decision.8 ' Although not all of Canada's provinces have yet filed lawsuits,
most of them have.86 Not surprisingly, the provinces have also enacted pro-
government statutes similar to British Columbia's Tobacco Damages and
Health Care Costs Recovery Act upheld in the British Columbia v. Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd. case. Thus, the other provinces will enjoy the same
dramatic causation and proof advantages that British Columbia will enjoy in
its trial.
The snowballing of statutes and lawsuits by provinces in Canada has
recently accelerated. New Brunswick was the first province to follow
84. Barbara Sibbald, All Provinces Likely to Join Tobacco Litigation, 173 CAN. MED. ASS'N. J.
1307, 1307 (2005).
85. Id.
86. British Columbia was the first Canadian province to file a lawsuit against big tobacco
companies. Anthony DePalma, In Canada, One Province Stands Alone Vs. Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/ll/22/world/in-canada-one-province-stands-alone-vs-
tobacco.html. In 2009, Canada's largest two provinces, Ontario and Quebec announced that they
were going to court and seeking $80 billion to pay for health care costs associated with smoking.
Anita Elash, Canadian Provinces Sue Tobacco Companies, National Public Radio News (Oct. 12,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 13670571.
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British Columbia's lead. After enacting a statute similar to and based on
British Columbia's statute, New Brunswick filed a lawsuit modeled after
British Columbia's lawsuit in 2008." Interestingly, New Brunswick
retained United States lawyers with experience in the states' healthcare
reimbursement lawsuits to assist the province with the lawsuit.88  One of
these United States lawyers estimated that New Brunswick had paid $10
billion or more in healthcare costs related to tobacco use.8 This highlights
the potential for a huge reimbursement recovery by New Brunswick.
Ontario, Canada's largest province, initially ruled out suing tobacco
manufacturers for healthcare reimbursement costs. 90 However, in 2009 the
province shifted course, enacting legislation modeled on the British
Columbia statute and filing a lawsuit similar to the British Columbia
lawsuit.91 Michael Perley of the Ontario Campaign for Action on Tobacco
estimated that the Ontario reimbursement lawsuit may be worth $50 to $60
billion dollars. 92 In addition to asserting that Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.
will not settle the case, a representative of the company responded that "[t]he
biggest losers here are going to be Ontario taxpayers." 93
By October 2009, eight Canadian provinces had introduced legislation
modeled on the British Columbia statute. 94  In that month Quebec
announced its plans to file a lawsuit.95 Although not confirmed, one of the
figures cited for the amount Quebec hopes to recover in the lawsuit is $30
billion.9 6 Repeating a response provided to the Ontario lawsuit, an Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd. representative asserted, "At the end of the day, the
biggest losers are Quebec taxpayers."9 Proponents of Canadian healthcare
reimbursement lawsuits disagreed. A policy analyst for the Canadian
Cancer Society observed that "tremendous momentum had developed for
87. Linke, supra note 34.
88. Id.
89. Id Presumably this estimate is for Canadian dollars rather than U.S. dollars, although as of
the writing of this article the exchange rate between the two is fairly close to equal.
90. Rob Ferguson, Ontario to Sue Big Tobacco for Health Costs, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 5, 2009,
http://www.thestar.com/article/596884 [hereinafter Ferguson, Ontario to Sue].
91. Ferguson, Big Tobacco Sued, supra note 82; Ian Austin, Seeking Billions, Ontario Sues
Tobacco Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/
business/30tobacco.html?r-l.
92. Ferguson, Ontario to Sue, supra note 90. Presumably this reference is to Canadian dollars
rather than U.S. dollars, although as of the writing of this article the exchange rate between the two
is fairly close to equal.
93. Ferguson, Big Tobacco Sued, supra note 82.
94. Mike King & Aaron Derfel, Suit Has Tobacco Firms Fuming; Quebec Action; Move to
Recover Health Care Costs Called 'Sheer Hypocrisy, 'MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 6, 2009, at Al.
95. Id.
96. Id. Presumably this reference is to Canadian dollars rather than U.S. dollars, although as of
the writing of this article the exchange rate between the two is fairly close to equal.
97. Id.
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provincial action in 2009."9'
The snowballing momentum of the Canadian provinces initiating
lawsuits or lawsuit enabling legislation modeled on the British Columbia
statute seems undeniable. Interestingly, snowballing of claims seemed to
play a significant factor in the United States healthcare reimbursement
lawsuits. In the early 1990s, at first only a few southern states filed
healthcare reimbursement lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers.99 The
manufacturers originally took a firm no-settlement stance in reaction to these
lawsuits. However, as the cases progressed, more and more states joined the
litigation, ultimately creating the specter of massive liability potential for
cigarette manufacturers. 00 In the face of this snowballing of potentially
huge healthcare reimbursement claims, the cigarette manufacturers lost their
resolve and accepted a settlement to help ensure their long-term survival.o
The analogy between the snowballing of states' reimbursement lawsuits in
the United States and provinces' reimbursement lawsuits in Canada may not
be perfect, but it is certainly worth noting.
British Columbia's trial is scheduled to go forward in fall 2011,102 and
its success or failure may play a pivotal role in decisions regarding whether
to enact similar legislation and initiate similar lawsuits in other nations. If
British Columbia's lawsuit is successful, the snowballing of governmental
healthcare recovery statutes and lawsuits that has taken place in Canada
could easily spread-particularly among nations that are enthusiastic about
the WHO's Tobacco Control Framework litigation provisions.
III. EVALUATING THE MERITS OF THIS EXPORT OF UNITED STATES TORTS
LAW
This Part considers implications of this dramatic export of United States
tort law concepts. This Part will focus on healthcare reimbursement
lawsuits, as they offer the greatest potential for significant tort damages and
potential impact on public policy. This is another way of saying that these
lawsuits have the strongest potential to make a real difference in the world.
There are many grounds for discomfort with tobacco healthcare
98. Id.
99. Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's Smoke Screen: State Lawsuits for
Reimbursement of Medical Expenses. 17 J. LEGAL MED. 113, 124-28 (1996).
100. See Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REv.
331, 337-38 (2001) [hereinafter Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation].
101. Seeid.at338-39.
102. Laura Payton, Feds Fight to Avoid Tobacco Lawsuits, TORONTO SUN, May 20, 2010,
http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/05/20/1402486 1.html.
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reimbursement lawsuits. Some reasons for this include the inefficiency of
the litigation system in promoting the lawsuits' goals of deterrence, and the
erosion of democratic processes that may accompany heavy regulation by
litigation. Regarding efficiency, it has been noted that the deterrence
benefits of tobacco lawsuits are difficult to measure.103  For example, if
smoking rates decline in the aftermath of significant tort litigation, it is
difficult to know how much the decline is attributable to general societal
trends, how much is attributable to negative publicity associated with the
litigation, how much is attributable to higher cigarette prices necessitated by
the expense of the litigation to manufacturers, and how much is attributable
to any number of other potential causes. Direct regulation by government is,
at least in theory, a much more efficient form of deterrent.' In addition to
obvious measures such as prohibiting sales of cigarettes to minors,
governments can tax cigarettes heavily to force higher prices and thus reduce
demand.'05 Increasing direct taxes to reduce demand is also somewhat
controversial, at least with regard to reducing demand among adults rather
than minors. Tobacco taxes are regressive and disproportionately burden the
poorest segment of society in the United States.'06 Further, if the taxes are
high enough they arguably become in effect a paternalistic ban on
smoking. 07  However, despite such concerns, direct taxation is (again, at
least in theory) at least a more linear approach to restricting consumption,
and it bypasses the expense and uncertainty of litigation.
Specific to lawsuits outside of the United States, additional problems
with using litigation to control consumption arise. First, many nations do
not have contingency fees, making these lawsuits more difficult to fund.'0o
The use of contingency fees to avoid up-front payments by the states
probably significantly enhanced the attractiveness of the reimbursement
lawsuits in the United States. 0 9 Not having this option would entail
political costs for many nations considering reimbursement lawsuits, as they
would have to risk a significant amount of taxpayers' money to fund their
claims. Indeed, tobacco manufacturers have sought to exploit this
103. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1737.
104. See id. at 1747 ("[I]t seems apparent that tort liability is an exceedingly blunt weapon for
doing battle with tobacco on the consumer demand front.").
105. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. However, governments must also consider
the level of taxation at which higher legal prices will lead to an unacceptable degree of black market
sales. Canada, which has high cigarette taxation rates, has struggled with this problem. See, e.g.,
Althia Raj, Smuggled Smokes Cost Tobacco Makers $550M in Deal, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/04/13/13570521.html.
106. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1730.
107. See id.
108. See Basil C. Bitas & Pedro P. Barros, Tobacco Control and the Role of Litigation: A Survey
of Issues in Law, Policy, and Economics, 16 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 29 (2008) (citing
"[t]he relative absence of contingent fee arrangements" as one of the factors that has in effect
restricted tobacco litigation outside the United States).
109. See id
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vulnerability by emphasizing in media interviews the high cost of the
reimbursement lawsuits to taxpayers. "0 Unlike in the United States, many
nations have loser pays rules for civil litigation, making risks higher for
governments.11' Damages awarded in many other nations tend to be smaller
than damages awarded in United States torts lawsuits, making lawsuits less
attractive.112  Particularly in developing nations, the amount government
spends on healthcare for its citizens may be much less than in the United
States, making reimbursement lawsuits less lucrative. Recordkeeping in
developing nations may be less advanced than in the United States, making
estimates of the amount spent on tobacco-related healthcare more
speculative. Finally, particularly in developing nations, civil liability may
be unreliable and adequate process to safeguard justice may be elusive.'"3
This could lead to unfairness either for tobacco sellers or for government
plaintiffs.
Despite all of these concerns and limitations, there are also a number of
considerations that may favor the export of U.S.-style healthcare
reimbursement lawsuits by other nations. Some of these considerations have
not received sufficient attention and are addressed below.
A. Lawsuits that Are a Product ofDemocratic Processes Rather than an
Evasion ofDemocratic Processes
In Canada, the provinces' enactment of specific legislation authorizing
healthcare reimbursement lawsuits mitigates, but does not eliminate,
concerns about sidestepping democratic processes. The states'
reimbursement lawsuits in the United States were justifiably criticized as a
circumvention of the democratic process.114  Particularly given that the
settlement payments were spread out over many years,' 15 many of the
United States lawsuits in a sense represented a tax enacted without
legislative supervision or approval. In Canada, by contrast, the lawsuits are
a product of the democratic process. Each of the lawsuits was authorized by
a vote of a provincial legislature.116 If the Canadian lawsuits are successful,
110. See, e.g., supra note 93 and accompanying text.
I11. Blanke, supra note 18, at 11.
112. See Bitas & Barros, supra note 108, at 29.
113. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for
Lincoln's Law Abroad, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2007).
114. See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or
Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 224, 226 (2002).
115. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1737.
116. See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
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given the significant evidentiary benefits they provide the government,1"
one might assume that other nations inspired to pursue reimbursement
lawsuits might enact similar legislation as well.
This does not completely eliminate concerns about compromising
democratic processes. Legislatures may feel that they have better political
"cover" in authorizing lawsuits that will have the indirect effect of raising
the "taxation" level on cigarettes than they would in authorizing more direct
tax hikes on cigarettes. Although they may have similar financial costs to
consumers, a legislator's vote to hike taxes on consumers may not be
popular, while her or his vote to force tobacco sellers to pay money to the
government may be cheered. Thus, reimbursement lawsuits may provide a
vehicle for sidestepping meaningful debate on whether additional taxation
on the whole benefits society. However, the potential messiness in the
making of statutes enabling tobacco reimbursement lawsuits is hardly
unique to this form of legislation. Otto von Bismarck is often quoted as
having observed that "[1]aws are like sausages . . . it is better not to see them
being made."' 18  Any concerns that statutes enabling healthcare
reimbursement lawsuits might be influenced by political posturing are
hardly sufficient to negate their status as a legitimate product of democratic
political processes.
B. The Role of Governmental Torts Lawsuits Against Tobacco Sellers as
Ombudsman
Research increasingly affirms that tort law can influence public
perceptions and policy as an ombudsman and educator. Governmental
reimbursement lawsuits may play an important role in educating and
reminding the public about the need to be wary regarding cigarettes and
cigarette manufacturers. The eminent torts scholar and jurist Justice Allen
Linden introduced the concept of torts law as ombudsman in 1973,1l9 and
the eminent torts scholar John Wade supported the concept in 1986.120 The
ombudsman concept promotes the role of tort law as a source of education
and publicity that may influence both private actors and public policy.12'
In the 2008 book Holding Bishops Accountable, Professor Timothy
Lytton studied the media impact of litigation on shaping public policy and
perceptions, using the Catholic priest molestation scandals as an
117. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Derek Wallbank, Legislative Sausage-Making: How a Bill Does Not Become a Law,
MINN. POST, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.minnpostcom/stories/2010/01/12/14823/legislativesausage-
makinghow a billdoesnotbecome alaw.
119. Allen M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155 (1973) [hereinafter Linden,
Tort Law as Ombudsman].
120. John W. Wade, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 65 OR. L. REv. 309 (1986).
121. See generally Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, supra note 119.
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illustration. 122 Some of Professor Lytton's findings have implications for
the educational role of tobacco litigation as well. He thoughtfully argued
that there is a close correspondence between the strategic considerations
guiding how plaintiffs' lawyers will frame a tort claim and journalists'
criteria of newsworthiness.' 23 Plaintiffs seek to frame tort claims as clear
and straightforward morality tales about right and wrong.124 Journalists
are more likely to find stories with this kind of framing newsworthy.125
Professor Lytton also documented that journalists have a tendency to
favor stories that are based on litigation documents, because official
documents are perceived as having more credibility than other sources.126
Further, stories with continuity are often considered more newsworthy
than other stories, and litigation provides an ongoing, unfolding story.'27
One might respond that in Western nations we have already been
educated enough about tobacco, and the risks are already known.
However, as children become teens and adults, there is a perpetual new
audience in need of the message. Most smokers initially become addicted
to cigarettes while they are teenagers.128  As addressed below,
governmental efforts to minimize cigarette smoking may be most effective
when directed at children,129 and governmental paternalism is less
controversial in the context of protecting children than in the context of
protecting adults. Further, even with regard to adults who have already
been exposed to information about the dangers of smoking and the conduct
of the tobacco industry, being exposed to information repeatedly probably
enhances the effectiveness of the message. 30 Repeatedly disseminating
information probably has diminishing returns, but that does not mean that
it has no returns at all.
Finally, the educational impact of healthcare reimbursement lawsuits
against cigarette sellers likely would be particularly strong in third world
populations with limited experience and information regarding addiction
and smoking-related illness. This may argue in favor of third world
nations, many of whom have expressed interest in the WHO Tobacco
122. TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE (2008).
123. Id. at 84, 94-101.
124. Id. at 85.
125. Id. at 84-94.
126. Id. at 84.
127. Id. at 98-99.
128. See Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking Behavior and the Regulatory Environment, 47 DUKE L.J.
1143, 1143 (1998).
129. See infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
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Control Framework's encouragement of litigation as a tobacco regulation
tool,"' going forward with such lawsuits. Indeed, media impact and
framing were specifically contemplated in a paper written for WHO early
in the process of considering enactment of the Framework on Tobacco
Control. 132
C. The Importation of United States Torts Litigation by Other Nations in
Tobacco Healthcare Reimbursement Lawsuits May Not Lead to Overuse
of Other Types of United States Torts Litigation Abroad
In many ways, the states' tobacco healthcare reimbursement lawsuits are
singular. 3 3 More than twelve years after the 1998 settlement, they have not
led to a flood of successful torts litigation by United States governmental
entities against other industries.13 4 Probably the most notable governmental
tort claims that have followed the tobacco settlement are lawsuits against
lead paint manufacturers and handgun manufacturers." These lawsuits
have met with only limited success.' 36  As addressed above, the legal
systems and societal conditions in many other nations make importation of
torts lawsuits that have been successful in the United States problematic. 37
"U.S.-style litigation cannot be imported, ready-made, into other legal
systems and cultures.""' Although any successful torts litigation against an
industry may to some extent encourage lawsuits against other industries, it is
far from a foregone conclusion that the lawsuits would lead to a wide-scale
importation of other types of U.S.-style torts litigation.
131. Cf Gostin, supra note 18, at 2539 ("Now that the tobacco industry is aggressively seeking
new markets in the poorest, least-regulated countries, litigation will take on new importance.").
132. Blanke, supra note 18, at 13, 26.
133. Cf Micah L. Berman, Smoking Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related Decisions on Public
Health Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (arguing that tobacco regulation cases in general are
exceptional because "courts tend to be unusually skeptical of attempts to regulate tobacco and of
plaintiffs' claims against the tobacco industry").
134. See Bitas & Barros, supra note 108, at 39 (arguing that, regarding tobacco litigation
generally, "it appears that the U.S. litigation experience is unlikely to be replicated abroad").
135. See Jacobson & Soliman, supra note 114, at 224 (describing gun control litigation, along
with tobacco litigation, as being one of "the two main areas where advocates have developed
litigation as a policy strategy"). The article concluded that "gun litigation has not succeeded at all."
Id. at 233; see also Saundra Torry, Lead Paint: The Next Big Legal Target, WASH. POST, June 10,
1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/june99/leadpaint0610.htm (predicting
lawsuits that will "mount a major assault on the former makers of lead paint," and that "[t]he
potential battle borrows much of its inspiration from the recent legal assault on big tobacco").
136. See Bitas & Barros, supra note 108, at 39; J. Russell Jackson, Products Liability: Lead Paint
Litigation, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 2008 (noting that losses in key court battles have led many
commentators to declare "the death knell for litigation against manufacturers of lead pigment and
paint in America," but asserting that litigation may continue).
137. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
138. Blanke, supra note 18, at 61.
304
[Vol. 38: 283, 2011] International Tobacco
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
D. Inefficient but Active Deterrence Offers Some Advantages Over
Deterrence that Is Theoretically Superior but Less Likely to Be Active
Evidence indicates that tobacco usage declines following media
campaigns. "9 Further, demand for cigarettes is at least somewhat sensitive
to price changes. 140 Children and young adults are even more sensitive to
price than are adults. 141 Smoking rates have dropped in the United States
since the $246 billion settlement heightened publicity and raised prices, with
the biggest drop being in teenage smoking. 142  Although a precise causal
connection to the United States healthcare reimbursement lawsuits would be
impossible to establish,143 from 1997 to 2009, adult smoking rates in the
United States dropped a little more than four percent.' As of 2009, the
adult smoking rate was down to 20.4%; it had been 24.7% in 1997.14' From
1997 to 2007, U.S. high school smoking rates dropped about sixteen
percentage points, from 36.4% to 20%. 146
Professor Robert Rabin has noted that a 2007 study of smoking rates
among teenagers in New York City showed a significant drop when high
taxes added three dollars to the cost of a pack of cigarettes, leading to a retail
price of seven dollars or more. 147  If more governmental entities were
willing to adopt this aggressive a level of taxation, probably fewer children
would become addicted to smoking, and, over time as they grow older,
smoking rates among the general population would likely also decline.148 In
139. See, e.g., Anita Kumar, Underage Smoking in Virginia Drops, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/10/AR2008091001001.html
(stating that officials in Virginia "credit the Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation for spending
millions of dollars on education, marketing and other programs to curb youth smoking" in
explaining a sharp decline in underage smoking in Virginia).
140. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1729-31.
141. See id. at 1765.
142. See Health Risk Factors and Disease Prevention: Tobacco Use, NAT'L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFo., (Jan. 2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/br.fcgi?book-healthus
09&part-healthriskfactors.
143. In addition to educational and publicity benefits, Professor Rabin notes that the states'
settlement is estimated to have increased the price of a pack of cigarettes by thirty-nine cents.
Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1738.
144. "The prevalence of current smoking among U.S. adults generally declined from 24.7% in
1997 to 20.4% for the period January through June 2009." P.M. Barnes, J.S. Schiller & K.M.
Heyman, Early Release of Selected Estimates Based on Data From the January-June 2009 National
Health Interview Survey, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 52 (Dec. 2009), http://www.cdc
.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/earlyrelease2009l2.pdf
145. Id.
146. Health Risk Factors and Disease Prevention: Tobacco Use, supra note 142.
147. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 10, at 1766.
148. Jacobson & Soliman, supra note 114, at 229 (arguing that over time, raised prices resulting
from the states' tobacco-related healthcare reimbursements lawsuits "should have the desired effect
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addressing what states in the United States can do to stop "[t]he tobacco use
epidemic," in 2010, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention placed
"[i]ncrease the unit price of tobacco products" at the top of its list.14 9
However, at present most governmental entities have not chosen to engage
in this level of direct taxation deterrence. Although in theory aggressive
direct taxation may be a more efficient deterrent than indirect taxation and
publicity through healthcare reimbursement lawsuits, in the absence of
higher direct taxation, healthcare reimbursement lawsuits provide at least
some real-world deterrence. Although a hammer may be more effective
than a rock at driving a nail into wood, in the absence of a hammer, use of a
rock may be worthy of consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his support of the tort as ombudsman theory, Justice Linden
emphasized that tort law may have important educational benefits even
though the damages may often be small, as they often are in Canada and
many other nations. 15 However, tobacco-related healthcare reimbursement
lawsuits are not among those small damages situations. With many billions
of dollars at stake, publicity and education are far from the only significant
consequences in the reimbursement lawsuits. On the other hand, the larger
the damages that are awarded in these lawsuits, the stronger the publicity
and education functions they will provide.
Justice Linden has explained that despite his love for the subject,
"[t]here are still some warts on torts."' 5' For example, the ombudsman and
educational benefits of tort law are by their nature difficult to measure. 52
With the stakes in multibillion dollar lawsuits as a regulatory tool
undeniably high, the imprecision and uncertainty of costs and benefits of tort
law as an educator are troubling.
As noted above, tobacco companies have stated that they will not settle
of reducing smoking prevalence rates among adults, along with reducing prevalence and incidence
rates among children").
149. Tobacco Use: Targeting the Nation's Leading Killer: At a Glance 2010, NAT'L CTR. FOR
CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION 2 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/aag/pdf/2010/toba
cco_2010.pdf.
150. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, supra note 119, at 156 (stating that tort lawsuits may have
a salutary effect on government and corporate defendants' conduct "even though the amount of
damages they must actually pay is insignificant").
151. Allen M. Linden, The Joy of Torts, in STEPHANE BEAULAC, STEPHEN G.A. PITEL & JENNIFER
L. SCHULTZ, THE JoY OF TORTS 474 (Butterworths 2003) [hereinafter Linden, The Joy ofTorts].
152. See Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, supra note 119, at 158. However, Justice Linden
notes that this uncertainty has deterrence advantages, because "the amount of penal fines and
damage awards are often easy to forecast, whereas the result of bad publicity is nearly impossible to
prophecy." Id.
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with the Canadian provinces. 5 3 This may be hyperbole. However, if the
tobacco companies do not settle, the pro-plaintiff statutes enacted by the
Canadian provinces will give the provinces significant litigation advantages.
Although the litigation's success is not "virtually guaranteed" as the tobacco
companies asserted in trying to convince the Supreme Court of Canada to
dismiss British Columbia's lawsuit,15 4 the possibility of dramatic success is
real. If the provinces settle for a significant amount or win at trial, the
victories will probably not spark another large general wave of individual or
class action tobacco lawsuits. However, a victory or even a strong showing
in a loss could encourage other nations to jump or re-jump into the pool with
healthcare reimbursement lawsuits against tobacco companies. With
cigarette companies relying on developing nations as markets for expansion,
the possibility of a new wave of healthcare recovery lawsuits in several
nations must be a matter of deep concern to the industry.
Because of the concerns addressed above, the prospect of success and
further expansion of healthcare reimbursement lawsuits should be a matter
of concern for all of us as well. However, along with this concern, we might
find some hope that these lawsuits could also provide imprecise but
pragmatic deterrence and educational benefits. There is characteristic
wisdom in Justice Linden's reminder that "[o]ur reach may exceed our
ability to grasp. But what we grasp for in the tort system is noble and
beautiful, a reflection of much that is beautiful in our society."'
153. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
155. Linden, The Joy of Torts, supra note 151, at 474.
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